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Abstract
The study of policy discourse comprises actor-centered and content-oriented approaches. We
attempt to close the gap between the two kinds of approaches by introducing a new
methodology for the analysis of political discourse called Discourse Network Analysis. It is
based on social network analysis and qualitative content analysis and takes an entirely
relational perspective. Political discourse can be analyzed in a dynamic way, and the
approach makes previously unobservable cleavage lines and alignments measurable at the
actor level, at the level of the contents of a discourse, and a combined layer. We compare
discourse network analysis with political claims analysis, a competing method, and apply
both methods to the European-level discourse on software patents. Our results demonstrate
how an anti-software-patent coalition was mobilized and how it gained control over
important frames, while the well-organized pro-software-patent discourse coalition was not
able to gain sovereignty over the discourse.
Keywords: Software Patents, Intellectual Property Rights, Discourse Network Analysis,
Social Network Analysis, Political Discourse, Policy Networks, Public Policy Analysis, Social
Movements, Political Claims Analysis
Introduction
Between 1997 and 2005, the question whether software patents should be allowed in Europe
became one of the most contentious issues in which the European Parliament and the other
European  institutions  have  ever  been  involved.  At  the  end  of  the  political  process,  the
European Parliament rejected the directive “on the patentability of computer-implemented in-
ventions”, which had been drafted and supported by the European Commission, the Council,
and well-organized industrial interests, with an overwhelming majority. From the dominant
resource-centered perspective of the interest-group literature, a resource-poor coalition of the
“weak” was able to prevail over a resourceful coalition of “strong” actors   (Beyers 2004;
Bouwen 2004; Kohler-Koch 1997). How could this unusual case happen?
We posit that an explanation must be sought in the realm of political discourse and its dynam-
ics. To understand political mobilizations, conflicts, and decisions, it is necessary to account
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helpful comments and the Max Planck International Research Network on Aging for financial support.
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Leifeld/Haunss 2010/21 3for the various verbal and symbolic interventions that precede and accompany them. The in-
sight that discourse matters in politics predates what has sometimes been called the “linguistic
turn” in the social sciences or the “argumentative turn” in political science. These more recent
developments have certainly spurred research in this area; today there exists a substantial
body of research about political discourses   (for an overview, see Janning et al. 2009). But
within the multitude of theoretical and empirical contributions, there is still a gap between
content-oriented and actor-centered approaches to political discourse. This article will shed
light  on  this  missing  link  and  introduce  a  novel  methodology  for  analyzing  political  dis-
courses empirically as well as theoretically. The approach called discourse network analysis is
compared with a competing method, political claims analysis, and both methods are applied to
the European-level discourse on software patents. The results indicate that discourse network
analysis outperforms political claims analysis in many respects.
Even though it would be beyond the scope of this paper to offer a full-fledged explanation of
the political outcome in the software patents case, we strive to demonstrate empirically with
our methods that the proponents of software patents did not manage to acquire hegemony in
the political discourse.
The structure of the article is as follows: the second section reviews existing approaches to
political discourse with an emphasis on political claims analysis and discourse network ana-
lysis. Section 3 applies political claims analysis to the European-level discourse on software
patents. Section 4 introduces discourse network analysis and subsequently applies it to the
same data. The section ends with a comparison of both approaches. The article concludes with
a summary of relative merits and drawbacks of discourse network analysis.
State of the art
The research on elite political discourse can be roughly divided into content-oriented and act-
or-centered approaches. Typical questions of a   content-oriented approach are: which compet-
ing frames exist, how are they connected to political goals and power, and which concepts in
the discourse are related to each other? Critical discourse analysis   (Wodak & Meyer 2009),
semantic network analysis   (Brandes & Corman 2003; Popping 2003) and analyses of legitim-
acy discourses   (Hurrelmann et al. 2009; Hurrelmann et al. 2007) are typical examples of re-
search with this perspective.
In the latter example, arguments of legitimation and de-legitimation are identified on the basis
of a systematic analysis of newspaper articles to answer the question whether de-parliamentiz-
ation and transnationalization erode the sources of legitimacy of national political systems. In
these studies, legitimation patterns are occasionally linked to the actors who use them. How-
ever, the focus is clearly on the revelation of patterns in the contents of the political discourse
while actors play a subordinate role.
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policy subsystems along the lines of the actors' preferences or ideas. This approach thus con-
centrates on changes in the mutual attachment of actors to explain policy change. Examples of
actor-centered  approaches  to  political  discourse  are  the  Advocacy  Coalition  Framework
(Sabatier & Weible 2007), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory   (Baumgartner & Jones 1991), epi-
stemic communities   (Haas 1992), discourse coalitions   (Hajer 1995), and policy paradigms
(Hall 1993).
The Advocacy Coalition Framework provides a typical example: actors are grouped into ap-
proximately two coalitions. Policy core beliefs are the “glue that binds coalitions together”
(Sabatier & Weible 2007), i.e., beliefs are more similar within a coalition than between coali-
tions. There are constant attempts of the coalitions to convince each other of their policy be-
lief systems. This interaction constitutes the political discourse. If external events lead to
learning processes and changes in the affiliation of pivotal actors to coalitions, policy change
becomes likely. The focus of this approach is on the learning behavior of actors, while the dif-
ferent concepts within the discourse play a subordinate role.
Both approaches, content-oriented and actor-centered, treat the connection between actors and
concepts as secondary factors. They do not analyze the co-evolution of actor configurations
and ideas in a systematic way. As Steensland observes, “few existing studies link frames with
the actors who sponsor them, thus presenting an oddly disembodied picture of framing pro-
cesses”   (Steensland 2008, p. 1031). In addition, discourses, let alone the co-evolution of act-
ors and ideas, are rarely systematically analyzed in longitudinal way: “This dimension of poli-
cymaking has proven especially difficult to model. Like subatomic particles, ideas do not
leave much of a trail when they shift. […] We need more studies of the evolution of policy
over time, a subject that has often been neglected relative to static, one-shot comparisons of
policy across nations” (Hall 1993, p. 290ff.).
One of the few exceptions is political claims analysis (PCA)   (Koopmans & Statham 1999),
which tries to establish the missing link between actors and contents in a discourse by em-
ploying a distinct set of methods, particularly a classification of actors as well as frames on a
one-dimensional pro/contra scale and time series graphs of discourse activity. The substantial
number of empirical applications of this hybrid approach includes political discourses on eth-
nic relations, citizenship and immigration   (Dolezal et al. 2010; Giugni & Passy 2004; Koop-
mans & Statham 2001), European integration (Statham & Gray 2005), on intellectual property
rights   (Haunss & Kohlmorgen 2009), and the Danish Muhammad caricatures controversy
(Lindekilde 2008).
Political claims analysis was introduced by Koopmans and Statham   (1999) to overcome the
weaknesses of protest event data analysis by collecting data not just on the actors and forms
of action, but also on the interpretations by actors involved in political conflicts. The method
thereby combines protest event analysis and discourse analysis. It expands the scope of the
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strations, decisions, and other kinds of political interventions conducted by actors. The goal of
PCA is to “trace the shifting alliances and oppositions between actors that evolve in the dy-
namic process of a political conflict”   (Koopmans & Statham 1999, p. 6). Data on political
claims is usually collected from newspaper articles. The unit of analysis is the claims (not the
protest). Each time an actor makes a claim, this action or statement is manually coded along
with various other variables containing information about the actor, the context, addressees,
opponents, aims, and frames, among others.
1
Drawing on PCA data, authors have been able to construct time lines of media attention to-
wards movements and policies   (Beyeler & Kriesi 2005), to identify differential participation
and differences in the construction of collective identities of claimants across polities   (Koop-
mans & Statham 2001), and, more generally, to analyze the salience of issues and patterns of
participation and mobilization.
In addition, since issue stances are also recorded, PCA allows for an analysis of actor posi-
tions on each issue on a one-dimensional scale ranging from complete endorsement to com-
plete rejection.
In sum, PCA so far has been used
• to identify the “multi-organizational field” of relevant actors, subdivided into several
categories like “media”, “churches” or “federal legislative”,
• to analyze the distribution of claims between these organizational types and compare
them within or between polities, 
• to map frames and actors on a one-dimensional scale, depending on how many claims
actors make in favor of the contentious issue or against it,
• to identify brokers who are located in the middle of this pro/contra scale, 
• to assess the degree of polarization between frames and/or claimants on the one-di-
mensional scale,
• to count the relative frequencies of certain frames among all claims in order to meas-
ure the relative importance of certain subtopics,
• and to generate time series graphs of statement frequencies that can be used to visual-
ize the intensity of conflicts over time (e.g., Haunss & Kohlmorgen 2009).
Political claims analysis thus provides a reasonable methodology to examine both actors and
their frames using a single dataset, and to analyze the connections between these two classes.
However,  with  the  exception  of  a  network  analysis  of  addressees  and  opponents  in  the
European  Union  enlargement  debate  (Adam  2008)  from  the  Europub  dataset  (Koopmans
2004), the relational information contained in PCA data has not been systematically explored.
1 A frame is an “interpretive [schema] that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s
present or past environment” (Snow & Benford 1992, p. 137). In the simplest form, frames are the
interpretations that underpin an actor’s argumentation.
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tirely relational perspective: Discourse Network Analysis (DNA)   (Janning et al. 2009; Leifeld
2009; Leifeld 2010b). The approach combines qualitative content analysis and quantitative
social network analysis in order to conceptualize and measure the co-evolution of actors and
concepts in a dynamic way.
Discourse network analysis is closely related to and can be integrated with the policy network
approach   (Adam & Kriesi 2007). Policy network analysis is actually a methodological tool-
box   (Kenis & V. Schneider 1991) and can be combined with many theories   (Lang & Leifeld
2009). In this broad definition of policy network analysis, discourse networks are merely one
relational type beside other relations such as resource exchange between actors or common
membership in committees. They can be conceived of as an extension of policy network ana-
lysis to discursive structures. This, however, presupposes an actor-centered perspective. Dis-
course network analysis is in fact broader in scope because the relations between concepts in
the discourse are also part of the relational model.










Advocacy Coalition Framework ● ○ ○ ○
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory ● ○ ○ ○
Discourse Coalitions ● ○ ○ ○
Policy Paradigms ● ○ ○ ○
Epistemic Communities ● ○ ○ ○
Critical Discourse Analysis ○ ● ● ○
Semantic Network Analysis ○ ● ○ ●
Legitimation Discourses ○ ● ● ○
Political Claims Analysis ● ● ○ ●
Discourse Network Analysis ● ● ● ●
In spite of its formalization, discourse network analysis is in the tradition of critical discourse
analysis and related approaches that try to disentangle the complexities of an empirical dis-
course and to unravel deep structures of power and identity   (cf. Wodak & Meyer 2009) Des-
pite their effort, we argue that existing hermeneutic approaches fail to make political dis-
courses observable in a systematic way, particularly over time. Discourse network analysis
can do both: extract deep structures from a complex discourse, and make them available to
formal analytic procedures. This still presupposes manual effort and inductive multi-pass cod-
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coding  procedures  like  political  claims  analysis  or  automated  content  analysis  procedures
used in semantic network analysis   (e.g., Carley et al. 2009). In particular, the network visual-
izations display the cleavage lines present in the data as well as the frames or actor coalitions
in terms of discursive similarity. This goes beyond a mere positioning approach of other form-
al methods of discourse analysis.
Table 1 summarizes the approaches introduced in this section. The next section will analyze
the European-level political discourse on software patents using political claims analysis. The
chapter is based on previous work by one of the authors   (Haunss & Kohlmorgen 2009). The
added value of discourse network analysis to the analysis of the same data is presented there-
after.
A political claims analysis of the European conflict about software patents
As outlined in the introduction, the software patents conflict between 1997 and 2005 has been
one of the most contentious issues in European Union politics. At the beginning of the dis-
course in June 1997, when the European Commission published its Green Paper with the title
“Promoting innovation through patents”   (COM 1997), nobody would have foreseen the con-
tentious trajectory of this conflict. In contrast, it was generally assumed that this arcane issue
would be resolved by the specialists and experts of the patent community with minimal inter-
ference. In retrospect, the software patents conflict in Europe was clearly an example of in-
creasingly  politicized  disputes  about  intellectual  property  rights  worldwide   (Haunss  &
Shadlen 2009). The issue soon started to attract the attention of many small software program-
mers and the free and open source community at large. The internet consultation launched by
the commission received 1450 responses within two months, 91% of the responses rejecting
the proposed patentability of software. Thousands of individuals, organizations, and firms
signed the “EuroLinux Petition” calling for a prohibition of software patents in Europe, and in
February 1999, FFII, the Federation for a Free Information Infrastructure, was founded to mo-
bilize against the proposed directive. They stood against resource- and powerful European
business associations ranging from the general European industry association UNICE (now
Business Europe) to technology associations like the Business Software Association (BSA)
and the European Information, Communications and Consumer Electronics Industry Techno-
logy Association (EICTA).
After the Commission had ignored all the critical submissions in its 2002 proposal for a dir-
ective “on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions”, a turbulent decision-mak-
ing process followed. In the first reading, the European Parliament followed in its majority the
software patent opponents’ arguments and de facto reversed the directive’s intentions with a
series of amendments, which the Commission and the Council almost completely removed in
Leifeld/Haunss 2010/21 8the so called “common position” in 2005. In the second reading in the EP, the directive was fi-
nally rejected with a huge majority of 648 to 14 votes.
During this conflict, an increasing level of public attention was paid to the issue. Whereas
software patents were a topic for a very specialized audience of patent professionals in 1997,
eight years later the issue was present in the politics, economy and technology pages of regu-
lar daily newspapers. 124 newspaper articles from four key countries (Germany, UK, France
and Poland) containing 277 claims were the basis for a political claims analysis of the conflict
whose results will be summarized below   (for more detailed results see Haunss & Kohlmorgen
2009).
Claims-making in the software patents conflict   occurred in four waves following the institu-
tional decision-making process. A relatively low-profile press coverage accompanied the con-
sultation phase and the publication of the proposal for the directive. More intense media atten-
tion followed the parliament’s first and second reading. In line with these institutionally struc-
tured media attention cycles, the group of actors whose claims appear most often in the press
are the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). They account for 18.8% of the claims,
followed by civil society organizations, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), large
corporations, and business associations, each responsible for between 12 and 10% of the
claims.
By considering issue stances, it is possible to construct a scale representing the average posi-
tion of the actor groups involved in the conflict (figure 1). As the figure shows, one large
cluster of opponents scored between -1 and -0.5 on the positional scale, together representing
a little over half (56%) of the actors mentioned in the press. At the other end of the spectrum,
the Council, the Commission, lawyers, business associations, and a number of large individu-
al firms supported the directive, but even the large firms were not unanimously in favor of it.
Only the Council and the Commission unanimously supported the directive. On the other side
Leifeld/Haunss 2010/21 9







































































































































































































































Figure 1: Mean actor positions in the software patents conflict
Note: Positions in this chart represent the mean position of actors of the respective type. Scientists, for example,
were in one instance reported to support the directive, nine times reported to be against the directive, and in three
instances their position was neutral or ambivalent, resulting in an overall score of ((1·1)+(9·(−1)))/13 = −0.62.of the spectrum, SMEs and national parliamentarians and parliaments are the only actors from
which only frames rejecting software patents were reported. While lawyers, business associ-
ations and large corporations largely supported the directive, the positional scale nevertheless
illustrates that these groups of actors were to some degree split in the conflict. The same goes
for the European Parliament whose members were more often quoted in opposition than in
support of the directive.
A look at the positional distribution of the frames reveals the main interpretive schemata em-
ployed by the actors. Figure 2 illustrates that the conflict was not dominated by a single
concept. Nevertheless two frames stick out because they have been used significantly more
often than others: “Competitiveness of SMEs” and “Innovation and Transfer of Knowledge”.
The opponents (e.g., software developers, SMEs, and some MEPs) claimed that the directive
would endanger European SMEs, who lacked the knowledge and resources to use the patent
system to their advantage, and supporters (large firms, European and national business associ-
ations, and again some MEPs) argued that SMEs would profit from the directive, as patented
“computer  implemented  inventions”  would  attract  venture  capital.  The  second-most  fre-
quently used frame, innovation and transfer of knowledge, was usually combined by the op-
ponents with the SME frame, arguing that SMEs are the cornerstone of innovation in Europe,
and that by putting SMEs at a disadvantage, software patents would have a negative impact
on European innovation. The other side generally followed the conventional wisdom of the
economic and legal mainstream, which regarded strong intellectual property protection and
especially patent protection as necessary for the protection of investments in innovation. Ac-
cording to this argument, not being able to file patents for computer-implemented inventions
would keep large corporations from investing in Europe, which would negatively affect not
only individual firms, but the whole European economy, resulting in the loss of many jobs.
Thus, the competitiveness of SMEs and innovation frames were clarified and invigorated by
both camps, though they were interpreted differently. The only relevant frame that was used
exclusively by one side was the open access/open source frame. It was relevant to some de-
gree in the internal discussions among opponent organizations, but in the public discourse it
played only a minimal role.
It is important to note that the most often-used frames were contested. No side was able to
claim a monopoly over these frames. Such a structure is typical of a political conflict in which
both sides take up the arguments of each other. The political claims analysis also reveals to
some extent how this is done: in the argumentation, frames were bundled with other frames
that could not be appropriated as easily by the political opponent in an attempt to pull the core
frames to the actor’s respective camps. Figure 2 suggests that the opponents were more   suc-
cessful in this respect, since even the innovation frame, which was the core frame of the Com-
mission’s original argumentation, ended up with a value below zero, which means it was more
often used in arguments against than for software patents.
Leifeld/Haunss 2010/21 10The  political  claims  analysis  of  the  software  patents  conflict  shows  that  the  oppositional
strategy is a good example of a successful re-framing strategy. Rather than concentrating their
efforts on constructing a consistent counter-frame, the opponents successfully shifted the ori-
ginal frames used by the Commission, effectively turning them on their head. To do this, the
opponents reaffirmed the necessity of innovation and a competitive European economy, but
claimed that the principal agents of innovation in the European IT sector were SMEs and that
only a directive that effectively prevented software patenting would safeguard innovation. In-
stead of attempting to establish a hegemonic counter frame, the opponents knit together vari-
ous frames, a strategy that Haunss and Kohlmorgen have called “frame bundling”   (Haunss &
Kohlmorgen 2009, p. 124). In addition, the opponents were able to construct a master frame
according to which innovation depended on the competitiveness of SMEs, which could in turn
only be secured without software patents. This provided a unified collective action perspect-
ive and allowed the opponents to mobilize a diverse constituency. Along with the democracy
frame, it resonated in the broader SME sector, and, more importantly, with many MEPs, who
finally stopped the directive – against the conventional wisdom of the EU interest-group liter-
ature that would have seen the much more resourceful and much better connected business as-
sociations and large software firms in a clear advantage.
Political claims analysis can thus be employed to analyze the empirical usage of frames by
actors and, in this particular case, the successful mobilization of opponents of software pat-
ents. However, the analysis leaves us with substantial uncertainty about the details of the
political discourse, particularly over time. Are there really two distinct coalitions, as suggested
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Figure 2: Mean frame positions
Note: Positions in this chart represent the mean position of the frames. The research and development frame, for
example, was used six times in a claim against the directive, twelve times in support and one time in a neutral or
ambivalent way, resulting in an overall score of ((−1·6)+(1·12))/19 = 0.32.gested by the Advocacy Coalition Framework or the concept of discourse coalitions? Does re-
framing, as discovered in a hermeneutic way, really take place, or are the actor coalitions mu-
tually exclusive in their choice of frames? Using the same data that was used for the political
claims analysis, we will demonstrate in the next section which additional insights can be
gained by applying the relational perspective of discourse network analysis to the conflict.
Discourse network analysis and its application to the software patents conflict
In the following paragraphs, we will describe a complementary methodology using a similar
approach to data collection: discourse network analysis is a combination of category-based
content analysis and social network analysis. We will subsequently show how the relational
information embedded in PCA data can be analyzed within the framework of discourse net-
work analysis.
As for the measurement unit, discourse network analysis takes a similar approach as political
claims analysis: statements of actors are the primary concern of data encoding. The latter
takes place inside the text data instead of using a separate spreadsheet. This helps to review
statements and their context later on and to do multi-pass encoding. The discourse network
model has been implemented in a free-to-use software called Discourse Network Analyzer
(DNA).
2 It serves two purposes: assigning actor and category tags to text data, and extracting
social networks from these structured data.
Affiliation networks
Figure 3 shows an illustration of the basic descriptive network model: there is a set of actors,
A={a1, a2 … am}, and a set of concepts,   C={c1,c2 … cn}, which correspond to frames in the
language of political claims analysis. An actor can either agree or disagree with a concept.
Thus, there are two relations between actors and concepts, one for agreement and one for dis-
agreement:   R={r1,  r2 …   rl}  with   l=2.  There  is  also  a  set  of  discrete  time  points  
T={t1, t2 … tk} because the discourse network can be repeatedly observed.
The most basic form is a bipartite graph of actors referring to concepts either in a positive or
in a negative way at a certain time point. The bipartite graph is called   affiliation network. It is
captured by the following equation:
Gr,t
aff=A,C ,Er ,t
aff   with  {a,a' }∉Er ,t
aff∧{c,c' }∉E r,t
aff
In this equation,   a' denotes an actor who is not identical with actor   a, and   c' denotes a concept
that is not identical with concept   c.  Er ,t
aff refers to the set of edges in the affiliation graph
G
aff at time t and for relation r.
The affiliation network   G
aff  corresponds to the solid lines between actors and concepts in
the illustration. The dashed lines among the actors and among the concepts depict the two de-
rived adjacency networks in which actors are connected who refer to the same concepts and in
2 The program can be downloaded from http://www.philipleifeld.de.
Leifeld/Haunss 2010/21 12which concepts are connected if they are used by the same actor (see below for details). Ap-
plied to empirical data, an actor is connected to a concept in the affiliation network if (s)he
makes a claim/statement in the media.
3
Figure 3: Illustration of the basic discourse network model
The concepts are in fact abstract categories under which certain claims can be subsumed. The
categorization works like category-based, computer-assisted, qualitative data analysis, but the
coder additionally specifies the actor to whom the statement can be attributed. The affiliation
network can simultaneously show actors and concepts as well as their interrelations, which
goes well beyond most existing measurement approaches to political discourse. Moreover, the
data can be subdivided into several time slices in order to obtain repeated measurements of
the discourse. Please note that there are two separate affiliation networks, one for the agree-
ment and one for the disagreement relation. They can be easily combined in a multiplex net-
work.
This is precisely what we have done when constructing the affiliation network of the software
patents conflict depicted in figure 4. The visualization shows only the critical phase of the
conflict, namely the last of the four waves described in the previous section, including all
statements between February 2004 and July 2005. The graph can shed more light on the ques-
tion which frames are contentious and which ones are “owned” by single coalitions.
As for the interpretation, opponents of software patents govern a number of frames almost ex-
clusively. Among them are the endangered competitiveness of small and medium enterprises
in the presence of software patents, the view that software patents might lead to undesirable
monopolies, and complaints about undemocratic behavior of the Commission and the Coun-
cil. The innovation and transfer of knowledge frame is used by both coalitions, but the net-
3 Possible data sources are newspaper articles, position papers, interview data and press releases. Depending
on the data source, there may be different kinds of validity issues, which have already been reported
elsewhere (e.g., Franzosi 1987).
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c4work analysis shows that a large number of oppositional actors refers to it whereas on the pro-
ponents’ side mainly EICTA uses it over and over again.
Note: Gray edges are positive citations of frames (in favor of software patents), black lines are negative citations,
thickness of the arcs represents the number of reported claims, size of the square nodes the indegree, i.e., how of-
ten this frame was referred to. Layout: Centrality layout (Brandes et al. 1999)
Proponents  emphasize  that  software  patents  would  promote  European  relations  with  the
United States, that software patents would strengthen private research and development ex-
penditures, that they would be needed for further European harmonization, and that stealing
other people's ideas is a criminal act. Thus, the most contested points of view between the two
coalitions refer to the economic sphere: economic growth and stability, and competitiveness
of the European economy are cited by both camps in rather different ways. The fact that pro-
ponents of the directive fail to monopolize economic arguments, rely on value-laden frames,
and do not manage to capture the core “competitiveness of SMEs” and “innovation and trans-
fer of knowledge” frames may explain their defeat. In this final and most important stage of
the discourse, opponents of software patents successfully re-frame some economic arguments
and, moreover, gain possession of some of these arguments completely.
Beyond being able to identify the core frames, the affiliation network also reveals how other
frames have failed to gain general traction and have been used only by selected actors. The
competitiveness of national economies was obviously not the best frame for an EU-wide con-
flict, and remained confined mostly to national actors. Harmonization, the credo of the Com-
mission, did not become popular either, nor did the open access/open source frame of the free
software community.
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Figure 6: Gray edges are positive citations of frames (in favor of software patents), black
lines are negative citations, thickness of the arcs represents the number of reported claims,
size of the square nodes the indegree, i.e. how often this frame was referred to. Layout:
Centrality layout (visone)
Figure 4: Affiliation networkCongruence networks
This one-shot description becomes more interesting if several time slices are measured, and if
changes in the affiliation of critical actors to certain solution concepts can be observed. How-
ever, tracking changes in affiliation networks can become a tedious task, and it is quite diffi-
cult to establish whether two actors actually exhibit high or low degrees of belief overlap, giv-
en this highly complex graphical representation of the discourse. One might not only be   inter-
ested in how actors relate to concepts, but also in how far discourse coalitions emerge from
this structure. The basic idea is that the more solution concepts two actors agree (or both dis-
agree) on, the more similar they are in terms of common beliefs in the discourse, and the more
likely they will belong to the same discourse or advocacy coalition. Thus, it is straightforward
to move from a bipartite affiliation graph to an adjacency graph where actors are connected to
other actors and where the edge weight between these actors represents the number of com-
mon concepts. The overall topology of the resulting congruence network can be used as a map
of the discourse where clusters of actors represent discourse coalitions. The congruence net-
work provides an intuitive way of conceptualizing and measuring advocacy or discourse co-
alitions (or other actor-centered discourse constructs, depending on the type of concepts used
for categorization).
If the bipartite graph is a representation of a rectangular matrix   X m×n  where actors occupy
the row labels and concepts the column labels, and where only the agreement relation or only
the disagreement relation is shown, the congruence network can be obtained by computing
X X
T , which yields a square actor x actor matrix with the number of shared concepts as
the cell entries. Both relations can then simply be added in order to combine positive and neg-
ative citations of concepts in a single network. In graph-theoretical notation, the weighted
congruence network is captured by the following equation:
Gt





In this congruence network, two actors are connected if they share a concept both in a positive
or both in a negative way. The link between the actors is stronger the more concepts they
share. The edge weight can therefore be interpreted as a measure of similarity between two
actors in the discourse. In the illustration in figure 3, the congruence network is represented
by the dashed lines between the actors on the left. For example, actor 1 and actor 2 are con-
nected because they both refer to concept 1.
As is the case with actors, we can also construct a   concept network based on the affiliations.
In this co-occurrence network, two concepts are connected if they are used by the same actor,
and the edge weight between two concepts equals the number of actors referring to both con-
cepts:
Gt





The concept network is illustrated in the right part of figure 3. For instance, concept 1 and
concept 3 are connected because they are both cited by actor 2. The edge weight can be inter-
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indicates that the member concepts of this cluster most likely belong to the same argument or
ideology.
Figure 5 applies the idea of an actor-based congruence network to the software patent conflict.
It was a polarized political conflict in which two competing coalitions existed. The PCA data
indicate that very few claims are neutral, while most of them are either clearly for or against
software patents. To some extent, this polarization is already visible in figure 1, but the ag-
gregation of individual actors into actor groups or categories somewhat obscures   the real po-
larization of the conflict. However, if we employ discourse network analysis, there is no need
to aggregate the actors.
Note: Circles represent organizations while octagons are Members of the European Parliament (Greens/EFA
green, PSE red, EPP-ED black, and GUE/NGL dark red). The pro-SWP coalition for each time period is in the
lower half, the anti-SWP coalition in the upper half of the picture. Line width reflects the number of different
frames two actors agree on. Actor labels have been omitted in order to improve legibility.
Figure 5 shows visualizations of the congruence network in the three periods presented in the
political claims analysis of the software patents conflict.
4 The first wave of the discourse from
January 1997 to July 2002 consists of the European Commission (the blue vertex) and two
4 Due to the low number of claims in the first and the second period, we have combined them.
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Figure 5: Congruence networks for three time periods: Jan 97 – Jul 02, Aug 02 – Jan 04, Feb
04 – Jul 05, from left to right









oFrench Members of the European Parliament (MEP) who belong to the European People's
Party (EPP-ED). The anti-SWP coalition consists of a Green MEP as well as several other act-
ors. All actors except for the European Commission are based in France. The first wave of the
discourse obviously takes place in the French press only. The remaining two waves are mainly
composed of EU-level actors with some exceptions from various European countries. In all
waves, there is absolutely no overlap between the coalitions in terms of statements, while
agreement within coalitions is substantial.
Let us take a look at Members of the European Parliament. If MEPs are aggregated at the
level of political groups and over time, the two largest groups PSE and EPP-ED connect the
two coalitions (cf. figure 6). Once broken down to the individual level and different time peri-
ods as in figure 5, however, the apparent broker role of the two biggest political groups disap-
pears. Rather than mediating between the coalitions by taking up frames from both camps,
PSE and EPP-ED are deeply divided between the two camps. Not a single MEP moves from
one coalition to the other over time or adopts positions from both coalitions. This solves the
puzzle which the political claims analysis in the previous section has revealed: the moderate
position of the MEPs on the one-dimensional scale of figure 1 disappears and turns into ex-
treme positions if MEPs are treated individually. The fact that the MEPs, although appearing
rather moderate, tend towards the anti-SWP position on average can be attributed to the fact
that a number of Green MEPs argues consistently over all time periods against software pat-
ents.
Another interesting finding from the congruence networks is the differential internal coher-
ence of the coalitions: in the first two waves, we can observe that the anti-SWP coalition is
not very clustered or dense (global weighted clustering coefficient: 0.75 and 0.56, respect-
ively; density: 0.32 and 0.36) while the pro-SWP subgraph – as a result of a common state-
ment by most of its members – is almost completely connected in the second wave (cluster-
ing: 1.51; density: 0.77). In the third time period, the pattern is reversed: the anti-SWP coali-
tion develops a rather consistent line of reasoning (clustering: 1.33; density: 0.77) while the
coherence of the pro-SWP coalition is slightly diminished (clustering: 1.28; density: 0.55).
The increased internal coherence of the opponents of software patents could be an explanation
of their success in forestalling the software patents directive: the more coherent a coalition ap-
pears in the public sphere, the more able it is to convince key decision-makers and voters. Fu-
ture research may show whether this hypothesis withstands comparative empirical tests.
Conflict networks
So far, co-occurrence networks of actors or concepts have been representations of similarity
between actors or between concepts. However, there is another piece of information hidden in
the original data: conflictual relations, or dissimilarity between vertices. For example, one act-
or makes a claim in a positive way while another actor makes the same claim in a negative
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ted to be prevalent between the clusters of a congruence network, but not within clusters.
Figure 6 presents a multiplex view of the actor network over all time periods, with black
edges representing congruence and gray lines conflict ties, i.e., direct contradictions between
actors on the same frame. As expected, the congruence relation exhibits strong bipolarity
between the coalitions. The more interesting question, however, is whether the camps simply
occupy different, non-overlapping topics or whether they actually refer to the same contested
frames and try to re-frame them according to their policy goals. The gray edges strongly sug-
gest the latter. Conflict ties are in fact rare within congruence coalitions, but very prevalent
between them. This can be confirmed statistically by considering the QAP correlation of -0.67
between congruence and conflict. The more frame congruence between two actors, the less
likely are conflict ties. The result corroborates the intuition that frame amplification and re-
framing are important strategies in the public discourse, as set out in the political claims ana-
lysis in the previous section and as suggested by the initial analysis of the affiliation network.
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As pointed out in the description of figure 5, political discourse is essentially a dynamic rather
than a stable phenomenon. Discursive interactions are conditional on past interactions. One
way to measure change over time is to subdivide the whole discourse into several time slices.
We have done this in the analysis of the four waves of the software patent conflict. Beyond
simply comparing static pictures, it is possible to use dynamic network visualization tools in
order to visualize the changing roles of actors in an animation. 
This is basically a discretization of time, which is actually continuous. However, by using dis-
crete time steps, one may lose some information. Generating a continuous-time animation
would be desirable. The above-mentioned software Discourse Network Analyzer offers sever-
al more nuanced ways to create dynamic discourse networks or to aggregate dynamic data
into static representations. The description of these longitudinal algorithms, however, is bey-
ond the scope of this article (see Leifeld 2010a; Leifeld 2010b for details).
Advantages of discourse network analysis
Political  claims  analysis  and  discourse  network  analysis  share  the  insight  that  statements
should be the primary unit of measurement and analysis, and that actors and concepts should
be analyzed simultaneously. But what are the advantages of discourse network analysis over
political claims analysis?
Firstly, political claims analysis assumes that a discourse surrounding one issue is one-dimen-
sional. Actors and frames are marked on a range from -1 to +1, designating opposition or sup-
port. This is also true of other text analysis approaches like the Wordscore project   (Laver et al.
2003). Discourse network analysis conceptualizes political discourse as multidimensional, and
one of the key insights it can generate is the number of cleavage lines that are actually empir-
ically present in the discourse. Depending on the concepts used to code the data and the scope
of the actors, it becomes possible to identify sub-topics and sub-coalitions in a policy subsys-
tem. Political reality is complex, and discourse network analysis is a suitable tool to reduce
this complexity to a degree that is interpretable by the researcher. A visualization of a dis-
course network immediately reveals how each single actor or concept is embedded in the dis-
course. At the same time, it is possible to assess the overall topography of the discourse and
identify cleavage lines and roles of actor types. Many studies provide only anecdotal evidence
for the existence of adversarial coalitions and changes in their composition. Apart from using
visualizations directly as explanations   (Brandes et al. 2006), network-analytic methods like
blockmodeling or centrality   (Wasserman & Faust 1994) can be employed to measure network
properties in a more reliable and valid way.
Secondly, discourse network analysis allows to distinguish neutral concepts from highly con-
tentious concepts which are only neutral on average. In political claims analysis, both kinds of
frames are placed in the middle of the one-dimensional scale: positive statements receive a
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frame are summed up, and the balance is taken as a measure of the pro or contra affiliation of
a concept. It does not make a difference if a concept is ten times neutral, or if it is cited five
times in a positive way and five times in a negative way. In discourse network analysis, neut-
ral statements do not exist. If a concept is highly disputed, this is visible in the affiliation net-
work because actors from one camp will cite the concept in a positive way, while actors from
the other camp will cite it in a negative way. If the pattern is less clear-cut between the camps,
the concept is more neutral.
Thirdly, discourse network analysis allows to track changes in the discourse over time. Polit-
ical claims analysis offers time series graphs of discourse activity and of the number of posit-
ive and negative citations at each time step. Discourse network analysis allows to observe if
an actor leaves a coalition and joins another coalition over time, or if a formerly united dis-
course is polarized and develops two or more distinct clusters of concepts over time. This
meets the demand of policy network scholars who have called for dynamic policy network
analyses for a long time   (McAdam 2003). The collection of network data is usually costly, so
there have been only few longitudinal network studies. Discourse network analysis allows to
accomplish this task, albeit for the sake of changing research questions away from (material)
coordination as in the policy networks approach towards (latent) preference similarity. Dy-
namic discourse network analysis also meets the demand of scholars interested in longitudinal
changes in policy ideas and learning (Hall 1993, p. 290ff.).
Fourthly, discourse network analysis can be nicely combined with other policy network ap-
proaches. Methods such as QAP regression   (Krackhardt 1988) or exponential random graph
models   (Robins et al. 2007) provide means to treat discursive ties as covariates of other net-
work relations.
Fifthly, the approach presented here can be conceived of as a lens through which a discourse
can be observed. Therefore it is not only applicable to empirical data. Discourse network ana-
lysis could be employed to understand the results of computational models of discourse or to
theorize about discourse-related behavior of actors.
Finally, discourse network analysis is flexible regarding the type of concepts used in the ana-
lysis. Discourse network analysis is not confined to the analysis of frames. It can be applied to
the actors' choice of solution concepts   (Hall 1993), linguistic peculiarities or symbols   (Wodak
& Meyer 2009), beliefs   (Sabatier & Weible 2007) or interpretive frames   (Hajer 1995), as in
our analysis of the software patents conflict.
Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a new methodology for the analysis of political discourse
which is complementary to existing approaches such as political claims analysis. Moreover,
Leifeld/Haunss 2010/21 20we have applied this approach to the European conflict about software patents. As for the soft-
ware patent case study, the analysis in the preceding sections has produced a number of inter-
esting findings and hypotheses:
• The constellation shows all elements of a highly politicized conflict. The actors are
split into two very distinct discourse coalitions which do not share a single conviction.
However, topical overlap between the coalitions is large, and conflicts between the co-
alitions (but not within coalitions) are prevalent.
• The European parties do not act as brokers between the discourse coalitions. Individu-
al MEPs rather stick to one or the other coalition. This runs counter to models of poli-
cy-making where parties take intermediary positions (e.g., the role of brokers as hypo-
thesized in the Advocacy Coalition Framework, or the moderating role of parties in
pressure pluralist or neo-corporatist systems).
• Over time, the internal coherence of the anti-SWP coalition increases while the intern-
al coherence of the pro-SWP coalition decreases. We interpret this as a learning pro-
cess in which the emerging oppositional coalition first has to develop a shared collect-
ive action frame. Once this unifying frame has been established, it has certainly im-
proved the chances of the anti-SWP coalition to impede the SWP directive.
• The anti-SWP coalition is able to reclaim important economic frames in the last stage
of the political discourse while the pro-SWP coalition is left with value-laden argu-
ments and some highly contested economic frames, which may have further contrib-
uted to the defeat of the pro-SWP coalition.
These substantial findings demonstrate that discourse network analysis is capable of produ-
cing insights which were previously unobservable when relying on conventional approaches.
Particularly, the discourse network framework allows to
• track the evolution of a discourse over time, 
• observe the overall topography of the discourse on the actor level, concept level or a
combined display, thus providing the missing link between actors and concepts, 
• measure discourses in a multidimensional way, rather than imposing a one-dimension-
al, reductionist constraint on the data, and 
• distinguish neutral from contentious concepts, something that political claims analysis
is only able to accomplish in a qualitative way.
However, there are potential limitations of this approach that researchers should keep in mind:
archival data like newspaper articles, position papers or parliamentary protocols answer dif-
ferent research questions than interviews or participant observation. While the former are
tailored for policy learning and discourse theories like the Advocacy Coalition Framework,
the latter may be able to explain policy change by reverting to power positions, bargaining or
institutions. Integration of these factors into a discourse network analysis is only possible on a
qualitative basis at the present time. A policy network analysis of the same conflict   (Haunss &
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documents, web pages), shows that the discourse network generated from newspaper articles
only partially represents the actors involved in the conflict. Public discourse represented in
newspapers   is skewed toward certain actors. Particularly MEPs are highly visible in the me-
dia, which probably overstates their ability to shape the political conflict. Conversely, many
smaller organizations, NGOs and individual actors are underrepresented in the news if com-
pared with the conflict network   (Haunss & Kohlmorgen 2010). Consequently, the analysis of
discourse networks should be combined with conventional methods. It is well equipped for
this task because its data structure is largely compatible with policy network analysis.
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